country as we examine the events of men ghazi. we have an expeditionary diplomatic corps, and they do face very real risks every day, day in and day out. bad things have happened before, and bad things will happen again, unfortunately, in the future. there will always be a tension between the diplomatic imperative to get outside the wire and the security standards that require our diplomats to work behind high walls and full-body searches. we do not want to conner is tee that wire america off from the world. our challenge is to strike a balance between the necessity of the mission, available resources and toll wraps for risk -- tolerance for risk. we've talked about this on this committee. we've had hearingsings specifically about the design of our embassies, the danger of becoming a fortress america. we need to be safe, but we also need to send the right message to the people that we're trying to reach. i distinctly remember feeling and seeing the difficulty of this in vietnam where villages would examine us suspiciously and give us a stare, an unmistakeable stare that raises many mo

the congress and the country as we examine the events of men ghazi. we have an expeditionary diplomatic corps, and they do face very real risks every day, day in and day out. bad things have happened before, and bad things will happen again, unfortunately, in the future. there will always be a tension between the diplomatic imperative to get outside the wire and the security standards that require our diplomats to work behind high walls and full-body searches. we do not want to conner is tee that wire america off from the world. our challenge is to strike a balance between the necessity of the mission, available resources and toll wraps for risk -- tolerance for risk. we've talked about this on this committee. we've had hearingsings specifically about the design of our embassies, the danger of becoming a fortress america. we need to be safe, but we also need to send the right message to the people that we're trying to reach. i distinctly remember feeling and seeing the difficulty of this in vietnam where villages would examine us suspiciously and give us a stare, an unmistake

, ambassador stevens warned that libyans have introduced an alert in the ghazi. on september 9, ambassador stevens requested additional security two days before the attack happened. i knew him quite well. i have a great deal of respect for him. in light of these findings, these are facts that no one has argued. to either of you what to say that you agree with the statements that i have read in the report? >> senator, the statement in the report says that there were no specific tactical threat is a statement i believe to be a statement of fact. you are right to point out the pattern of deteriorating security on each of the incidents you discussed. amongst that deterioration are part of that deterioration was a byan violence.i we did not do a good enough job of connecting the dots of the troubling pattern. >> mr. secretary nides, you agree with the statement he made? for the record, if you could respond i would appreciate it. >> yes, sir, i do. >> the most significant question is not in the report and i would like to get a response to. were the comments of ambassador rice completely in a rac

limits anymore and foreign policy. a tragedy occurred in benghazi. ghazi is inherently unstable. would that be a fair statement, ambassador burns? you might guess commissary. then ghazi in that. and to this day still in a very unstable place. >> have you read the report chaired by ambassador pickering and admiral mullen? >> i certainly have. >> tobacco include the susan rice for secretary clinton or charlene lamb were responsible, was that the conclusion of this report? >> the report concluded it was terrorists responsible for the deaths of our four colleagues. >> at the report concluded deliberate or less than deliberate effort to cover that fact at any time at the time of the events are subsequently? >> no commissary. >> is it fair perhaps to conclude that in retrospect, mistakes are made within the state department about the allocation of resources and the nature and extent of security that needed to be provided to benghazi? >> is certainly is. it is quite clear and candid in identifying problems that occurred. those problems are unacceptable. we take responsibility for them and we

scene in ghazi that i, who were in tripoli, who were in washington. .. >> what they had was not enough. either in benghazi or the overwhelming numbers. frankly, the state department had not given security for personal resources it needed. on that note, let me ask admiral mullen in regards to the specific findings. >> thank you, mr. ambassador, i appreciate that. i do appreciate your leadership throughout this process as well. good afternoon. the board found that the attacks on benghazi were security related. responsibility for the loss of life committee injuries, and damage to u.s. facilities rest completely and solely with the terrorists who conducted the attacks. that does not mean that there are lessons to be learned. the board found that the security posture at the special mission compound was inadequate for the threat environment in benghazi, and in fact, grossly inadequate to deal with the attacks that took place that night. state department bureau that was supporting benghazi had not taken on security is a shared responsibility. so that support the proposed needed was oft